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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.990437-CA
v.
JAMES L. THOMPSON,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for willful evasion of income tax, a second
degree felony, and making a false tax return, a third degree felony. This Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Was evidence that defendant boasted about his ability to avoid paying
taxes, obscured his wages by taking the majority of them in third-party
checks, attempted to have the 1099 reporting those checks as income
"zeroed out," succeeded in having the 1099 reduced below the figures
recorded in his own ledger, and then claimed business expenses for a
non-existent business sufficient to support thefindingthat his conduct
was intentional and willful?
This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and

all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, we find that 'the
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing

as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust."5 State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5,
f 19, 999 P.2d 565 (quoting Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998)).
II.

Was the trial court required to give defendant's good faith instruction
where the jury's instructions defining intent were inconsistent with a
finding of good faith?
"Whether the trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction constitutes

error is a question of law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness." State v.
Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, If 11, 17P.3d 1153.
III.

Should this Court reject defendant's claim that the trial court
improperly denied his motion for new trial where defendant relies on
grounds not preserved below?
No standard of review applies to this issue.

IV.

Is a new trial required because one witness's testimony was unrecorded
due to a malfunction in the recording device where this Court granted
the State's unchallenged motion to supplement the record with an
affidavit from that witness?
No standard of review applies to this issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following dispositive statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-401;
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103;
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1101.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 23, 1998, defendant was charged by information with one count each of

willful evasion of income tax, a second degree felony, and making a false tax return, a
2

third degree felony, in connection with his 1996 state income tax returns (R. 3-5). After a
four-day jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 182-84). Defendant was
sentenced to zero-to-five years for filing a false tax return and one-to-fifteen years for
willful evasion of income tax (R. 182). Defendant's sentences were suspended and
defendant was ordered to serve twenty days in jail, pay a $15,000 fine, and serve seventytwo months on probation (R. 182-84). Defendant's motion for new trial was denied
without a hearing (R. 213-16). Defendant timely appealed (R. 217-18).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
After working for Neways, Inc. for four or five months, defendant, as corporate
counsel, arranged for his salary to be cut to one-third of his actual wages and for the
remainder of his compensation to be paid by way of third-party checks to himself and
various bill collectors (Tr. 47). According to a friend defendant recruited to join the
company a few months later, defendant explained that "one of the advantages" of
working for Neways "would be that I would be able to earn all of my income tax-free"
(Tr. 44-45). Defendant encouraged the new employee to take his wages in the same way
defendant did as "a way I could avoid taxes" (Tr. 47). Defendant explained that he kept
track of his additional income by maintaining a ledger in which he detailed the checks
paid by Neways on his behalf (Tr. 58-59; St. Exh. 1).
However, when defendant received an IRS form 1099 from Neways reflecting
those third-party payments, he angrily but unsuccessfully demanded that the 1099 be
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"zeroed out" because "the deal" was that "he would be paid a certain W-2 income and
that the rest wouldn't show up anywhere" (Tr. 68, 106,175). He then worked with
Neways owner Dee Mower to reduce the 1099 total by omitting some of the third-party
payments despite their being included in his ledger (Tr. 353, 367, 392; St. Exh. 1, 20).
In addition to these revisions on his 1099, defendant further lowered his taxable
income by claiming business expenses on his federal tax return for a non-existent
business (Tr. 197-99, 262-63, 291-94). As defendant explained to his friend, despite
having to claim the 1099 income, he nonetheless "managed to whittle [his taxes] down
quite a bit" by being "creative" (Tr. 70).
Although a full-time employee of Neways, when confronted by an investigator for
the Utah State Tax Commission, defendant claimed he worked only part-time for the
company and that he had few other billable hours (Tr. 199-200).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue I. Where defendant boasted about his ability to avoid paying taxes, obscured
his salary by taking the majority of it in third-party checks, succeeded in reducing the
amount of those checks he would have to claim as income, and then claimed business
expenses for a non-existent business, the evidence was sufficient to find that he
intentionally and willfully evaded taxes and filed a false income tax return.
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Issue II. The trial court was not required to give defendant's proposed good faith
instruction where the trial court's multiple instructions on intent ensured that defendant
would not be convicted if he acted in good faith.
Issue III. Most of the issues now raised to challenge the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion for new trial were not raised below. Thus, they are not properly
before this Court. The only issue that was raised in defendant's motion below—that a
witness gave inconsistent testimony—was waived when defendant failed to object to that
witness's testimony at trial. Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
Issue IV. The loss of one witness's testimony due to a recording malfunction does
not require reversal where this Court granted the State's uncontested motion to
supplement the record with that witness's affidavit.
ARGUMENT
I.

EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT BOASTED ABOUT HIS ABILITY
TO AVOID PAYING TAXES, OBSCURED HIS SALARY BY
TAKING MOST OF IT IN THIRD-PARTY CHECKS, HAD HIS 1099
REDUCED BELOW FIGURES RECORDED IN HIS OWN LEDGER,
AND THEN CLAIMED BUSINESS EXPENSES FOR A NONEXISTENT BUSINESS WAS SUFFICIENT TO FIND THAT HIS
CONDUCT WAS INTENTIONAL AND WILLFUL.
Defendant claims that his convictions should be reversed because "the evidence

presented at trial established only that the defendant relied on the W-2 and 1099 tax
statements prepared for him by Neways." Aplt. Br. at 18. Thus, according to defendant,
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the "State failed to prove that [he] acted in a willful or intentional manner" in committing
the tax violations. Aplt. Br. at 17,18.
Section 76-8-1101 of the Utah Code provides, in relevant part:
(b)

(c)

Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement
of Title 59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax
Commission,... makes, renders, signs, or verifies any false
or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or
fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony
Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax
or the payment thereof is . . . guilty of a second degree felony.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (1999); see also Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-401(9)(c), (d)
(1996). Under section 76-2-103(1), a person acts "[i]ntentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (1999).
This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and
all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, we find that 'the
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing
as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.'" State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5,
K 19, 999 P.2d 565 (quoting Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998)).
A.

Because defendant has failed to carry his marshaling burden,
this Court should refuse to consider this claim.

To challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant "'must first marshal all
the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate how this evidence, even
6

viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to support the verdict.'" State v.
Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, % 25, 989 P.2d 503 (quoting State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810,
819 (Utah App. 1994)). Here, defendant carries none of that burden with regard to
business deductions he claimed for a non-existent business.
In his brief, defendant acknowledges that Becky MacKenzie, an auditor with the
Utah State Tax Commission, "testified that wages could not be reported on a Schedule C
and that a taxpayer cannot take a business deduction against wages for a vehicle,
advertising, office expenses or utility payments." Aplt. Br. at 10.
However, defendant fails to marshal the evidence indicating that this is exactly
what defendant did. Specifically, defendant fails to marshal the following evidence: that
Schedule C is a federal income tax form on which a taxpayer records deductible business
expenses (Tr. 197); that defendant filed a Schedule C with his federal income tax return
on which he claimed advertising expenses, car and truck expenses, office expenses, taxes
and licenses expenses, travel and entertainment expenses, utility expenses, wage expenses
and document framing expenses for a total of $16,998.55 in business expenses (St. Exh.
3); that Ned Shimizu, a criminal investigator with the Utah State Tax Commission,
checked with the State Department of Commerce and with the Tax Commission to
determine whether defendant had a business and found nothing (Tr. 197-98); that the
business address listed on the Schedule C was a rented mail box (Tr. 199); that the only
car listed with the State as belonging to defendant or his family was a 1972 Honda Civic
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for which the registration had expired in 1994 (Tr. 210, 249); that defendant drove a
Landrover provided by Neways for both personal and business use (Tr. 70-71); that
Becky MacKenzie testified that one cannot claim a deduction for use of an employer's car
(Tr. 262); that defendant claimed wage expenses but had no withholding account and the
State received no W-2's for those wages (Tr. 291-94); that the utility expenses defendant
claimed were suspect because there were no rent expenses and no expenses for a home
business (Tr. 293-94); that, after defendant filed his income tax returns, he told his coworker, Allen Davis, that he had been "creative" and had "managed to whittle [his taxes]
down quite a bit" (Tr. 70); that defendant was a full-time employee of Neways in 1996
but told Shimizu that he worked only part-time, about 20 hours, and had very few billable
hours on the side (Tr. 73, 92, 98, 134,185, 200; State Exh. 2).
In addition to not marshaling this evidence, defendant fails to "demonstrate how
this evidence . . . is insufficient to support the verdict[s].'" Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305,
at f 25 (quoting Strain, 885 P.2d at 819). Instead, defendant focuses solely on the
evidence concerning his 1099. See Aplt. Br. at 12-14, 15-22.
On appeal, defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence concerning
his intent to commit the crimes for which he was convicted. See Aplt. Br. at 15-22.
Because evidence of his conduct surrounding his Schedule C is highly probative of that
intent, defendant's failure to marshal this evidence defeats his insufficiency claim.
Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, at 125.
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B.

Evidence that defendant gloated about his ability to avoid paying
taxes, arranged payment of his salary to disguise his income,
convinced Neways' owner to reduce his 1099 income below that
recorded in his own ledger, and then claimed non-existent
business expenses support the jury's finding that his conduct
was willful and intentional.

Defendant asserts that because "[tjhere are few, if any, Utah appellate decisions
construing the statutes under which the defendant was charged," this Court should look to
federal case law "as to how the elements of the Utah statutes should be construed with
respect to the elements of intent and willfulness." Aplt. Br. at 16-17. Defendant then
claims that because the federal standard requires proof of a specific intent to violate the
law, "it is apparent that the State failed to prove that the defendant acted in a willful or
intentional manner." Aplt. Br. at 17.
However, "intent" and "willfulness" are defined terms within the criminal code.
Thus, defendant's reliance on federal case law is misplaced. Moreover, in addition to not
marshaling the evidence of his improper Schedule C deductions, defendant misrepresents
the evidence concerning his attempts to have his original 1099 reduced. The evidence, as
properly presented, supports defendant's convictions.
1.

The statutory definitions of "intentionally" and
"willfully" apply to Utah's tax evasion statutes.

Defendant claims that the definition of the "elements of intent and willfulness"
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (1999) "is a question of first impression in this state"
because "[t]here are few, if any, Utah appellate decisions construing the statutes under
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which the defendant has been charged." Aplt. Br. at 16. However, because those statutes
merely require this Court to apply terms already defined by the legislature, this Court's
function involves nothing more than application of the traditional rules of statutory
construction.
'"[T]he power to define crimes and fix the punishment for those crimes is vested
in the legislature.'" State v. Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, \ 13, 21 P.3d 249 (quoting State
v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah 1988)); see also State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1206
(Utah App. 1992) ("[T]he legislature, not the judiciary, holds the power to defines crimes
and to fix any punishment for those crimes."). Thus, this Court has no power to rewrite a
statute and "'will not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there.'"
J J. W. v. State, 2001 UT App 271,1f 17, 430 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (quoting Arrendondo v.
Avis Rent A Car Sys., 2001 UT 29,112, 24 P.3d 928).
Rather, this Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute
was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ^j 25, 4 P.3d 795; see also Brixen &
Christopher Architects, P.C. v. State, 2001 UT App 210, f 14, 29 P.3d 650. In doing so,
this Court "assume[s] that each term in a statute was used advisedly." Stephens v.
Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1998). Therefore, this Court
"presume[s] that when the Legislature defines a term of art and later uses that term in the
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same body of statutes, it intends a consistent meaning." State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 847
(Utah 1992) (discussing need to adhere to statutory definition of "intentionally").
Here, defendant was charged with violating section 76-8-1101(b) and (c). Those
provisions provide:
(b)

(c)

Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement
of Title 59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax
Commission,... makes, renders, signs, or verifies any false
or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or
fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony....
Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax
or the payment thereof is . . . guilty of a second degree felony.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (1995); see also Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-401(9)(c), (d)
(

). Thus, to find defendant guilty under subsection (b), the State had to prove that

defendant intended to evade either a tax or tax-related requirement when he filed his false
tax return. To find defendant guilty under subsection (c), the State had to prove that
defendant acted willfully when he attempted to evade or defeat a tax or payment thereof
when he attempted to hide some of his income.
Both of these intents are defined in section 76-2-103(1) (1995). Under section 762-103(1), a person acts "[i]ntentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1)
(1995).
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Therefore, to convict defendant under section 76-8-1101(b), the State had to prove
that defendant had a conscious objective or desire to evade either a tax or a tax-related
requirement when he filed his false tax return. To convict him under section 76-81101(c), the State had to prove that defendant had a conscious objective or desire to
evade taxes or payment thereof when he arranged to have the majority of his wages taken
in third-party checks and then attempted to have the 1099 recording those checks reduced.
Contrary to defendant's claim, in neither case did the State have to also prove that
defendant acted with a specific intent to violate the law. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d
1355, 1358 n.3 (Utah 1993) (holding that "[t]o act willfully .. .means to act deliberately
and purposefully" in committing the act but "does not require an intent to violate the
law").
2.

The evidence is sufficient to find defendant acted
intentionally and willfully in attempting to evade payment
of income tax and in filing a false income tax return.

Defendant claims that the State did not show that defendant acted "willfully" in
evading taxes because its own witnesses "unanimous[ly] testified] . . . that the defendant
had no impact on the amounts that Neways included or excluded in the 1099s other than
making his full records completely available to its accountants and owners." Aplt. Br. at
21. However, in addition to not marshaling the evidence of his improper Schedule C
deductions, defendant misrepresents the evidence concerning his attempts to have his
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original 1099 reduced. The evidence, as properly presented, supports defendant's
convictions.
Just a few months after beginning his employ at Neways, defendant arranged for
his recorded income to be reduced to one-third of his actual salary and for the remainder
of his salary to be paid through third-party checks (Tr. 47). Defendant kept track of what
Neways owed him and paid on his behalf in a ledger (Tr. 59-60; St. Exh. 1).
When defendant recruited Allen Davis to work for Neways a few months later, he
told Davis that "one of the advantages . . . would be that [he] would be able to earn all of
[his] income tax-free" (Tr. 44,47). He also talked with Davis about using off-shore
banks as another means to get money without "rais[ing] any flags" because the money
would not be traceable (Tr. 46).l
In early 1997, defendant received a miscellaneous compensation form 1099 from
Neways reflecting the third-party payments made on his behalf in 1996 (Tr.

).

Defendant was "furious" because "[t]hat was not the deal" (Tr. 68, 141, 192). Defendant
claimed the "deal" was that "he would be paid a certain W-2 income and that the rest
wouldn't show up anywhere" (Tr. 106).

Although defendant claims this evidence was "unsubstantiated innuendo of
unproven schemes" admitted only to "inflamef] the jury," Aplt. Br. at 12, 22, evidence
that defendant contemplated such schemes was relevant to defendant's intent at the time
he had the 1099 total reduced and filed his 1996 income tax return.
13

Defendatnt thus ordered Neways payroll accountant Annette Jenkins—the same
person he had recently caught embezzling funds—to "zero-out" the 1099 (Tr. 69,175).
When owner Dee Mower informed him that outside counsel had advised her that a 1099
had to issue, defendant worked with Mower to reduce the 1099 amount (Tr. 107, 367,
392; St. Exh. 16). Mower agreed to remove certain amounts from defendant's 1099,
despite the fact that several of those amounts were recorded as third-party payments made
on defendant's behalf in defendant's own ledger (Tr. 392; St. Exh. 1, 20). Minimizing
the 1099 amount was "very important" to defendant and it "took quite awhile before it
was finally reduced a certain amount to where he would accept it" (Tr. 70).
Finally, despite Davis's telling defendant that the revised 1099 was now
inaccurate, defendant used it to file his 1996 income tax returns (Tr. 96). In addition, as
noted above, defendant claimed numerous business deductions for a non-existent business
and then bragged to Davis that he had "managed to whittle [his taxes] down quite a bit"
by getting "creative" (Tr. 70-71,197-99, 210,249, 262,291-94; St. Exh. 3). Then,
although defendant was a full-time employee of Neways, he told Tax Commission
investigator Shimizu that, in 1996, he worked only part-time, about 20 hours, and had
very few billable hours on the side (Tr. 73, 92, 98, 134, 185, 200; State Exh. 2).
This evidence is sufficient to show that defendant intended to evade a tax or tax
requirement when he filed his false tax return and that he willfully attempted to evade
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payment of taxes when he arranged to have his salary paid through third-party checks and
then worked to have his 1099 reduced.
Consequently, defendant's in si ill u'i ciu'> claim fails
TEE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE A GOOD
FAITH INSTRUCTION WHERE THE JURY'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEFINING INTENT WERE INCONSISTENT WITH A FINDING OF
GOOD FAITH.
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly rejected his proposal insh urtion
that "[i]f the Defendant had H JJOIHI faith hv I id' thai the information received on the 1099
was accurate, you may not find [] him guilty." Aplt. Br. at 22 (citing R. 137; Def.
Proposed Jury Instr. 5). Defendant claims that "the failure to give instructions with
respect to a defendant's good faith reliance on an accountant or Him v\pvii constitutes
reversible erroi

V>
| 11 Bi n ' M« it my fi\ e feclemt circuit court cases). However, the

trial"'OIII 1 properly rejected defendant's proposed instruction because its substance was
properly covered in other instructions.
Although a defendant is entitled to have the jury r
crime if there is a "basis in the evidence to suppor t that theory," State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d
487, 495 (Utah App. 1992), a trial court "does not err by refusing a [defendant's]
proposed instruction if the point is properly covered in the other instructions," State v.
Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah App. 1997) (citations and internal qi iotation marks
omitted), aff'd, 937 V <d 4? S«I (tah 1998); see also State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,
1231 (Utah 1998). "Failure to give requested jury instructions constitutes reversible error
15

only if their omission tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party
or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law." State v. Stringham, 2001 UT
App. 13, f 17, 17 P.3d 1153 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ^f 17, a communications fraud and racketeering
case not even cited in defendant's brief, the defendants claimed that the trial court "erred
by refusing to give a good faith instruction in the context of the communications fraud
charges." To support their argument, defendants relied on a body of federal case law—as
defendant does here—holding that "'general instructions on willfulness and intent are
insufficient to fully and clearly convey a defendant's good faith defense to the jury.5" Id.
at 118 (quoting United States v. Haddock, 956 F,2d 1534, 1547 (10th Cir. 1992)).
This Court rejected the defendants' argument, noting that the federal case law on
which they relied reflected a "minority position." Id. at f 19-20. Instead, this Court
adopted the "reasoning of the majority" of jurisdictions and held that "if a jury instruction
'already contains a specific statement of the government's burden to prove [that the
accused acted knowingly and willfully], the good faith instruction is simply a redundant
version of the instruction on those elements.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Gross, 961
F.2d 1097, 1103 (3rd Cir. 1992)). Under such circumstances, a separate good faith
instruction is not required because "'a jury finding that the defendant has acted knowingly
and willfully is inconsistent with a finding that the defendant acted in good faith.'" Id. at
U 20 (quoting Gross, 961 F.2d at 1103). "'By giving a detailed instruction on the
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elements nl the aunt; wild whirli [defendants] w[ere] charged, the court ensured that a
(in v finding of good faith would lead to acquittal.'" Id. (quoting Gross, 961 Kid at 1 I lrt)
(brackets in original); see a/so United States v. Pomponio.
curiam) (holding, in tax case, that whc .
willfulness[5 ajn iddilional iiisti nation

e (>\ i r t
s

*•

n) | pci
-J

* r i ct[s] the jury on

good faith [is] unnecessary"); Cheeks v. United

States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (same); United States v. Evangelista, 122 F.3d 11
n.5(2dCir. 1997); United States v. Brimberry, 961 K2J I2K<>, J*) I (7Ml(/ir 1<><>2); /./w/<v/
States v. Dorotich, 900 F.2d I'M I*) * I')11' C\x I WO): ( ">I//IY/ „V/a/(^ v. 5/wie, 431 F.2d
1286, 1289 ^ii'M^'C'V VHO).
Here, in connection with the charge of filing a false tax return, the jury was
instructed that it could convict defendant only if it found that he made
intentional attempt, act or omission, to • ^i . •

,
>;, that he had "a

voluntary, conscious (Jcsiic t< > engage in conduct that is a violation of a known legal
duty"; and that he "acted or failed to [act] when the law required him to act voluntarily
and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something he knew tin h\\\ piohihieci"
(R. 70; Addendum B).
i 11 '. • 11111 ii i • 11 'i > 11 w i f 11 (11 c charge of willfully evading a tax, the jury was instructed
that it could convict defendant only if it found that he "knew and understood that. , he
owed more Utah State Income Tax . , and then tried in some way to ;ivoid thai additional
tax"(R. 80; Addendum Ii) dial \w "had actual kiatwli dj»c that his conduct was wrongful"
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(R. 81; Addendum B); and that he committed "a voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty with the specific intent to do something he knew the law prohibited,...
that is to say, with intent either to disobey or to disregard the law" (R. 82; Addendum B).
In addition, the jury was instructed that defendant's conduct was "not willful" if he
acted out "of negligence (even gross negligence), inadvertence, accident, mistake, or
reckless disregard for the requirements of the law, or due to his honest misunderstanding
of the requirements of the law" (R. 74; Addendum B); and that, "[t]o find the Defendant
guilty of either of the crimes . . . , it is not enough to show merely that a lesser tax was
paid than was due, nor is negligent, careless, or unintentional understatement of income
sufficient" (R. 87; Addendum B).
Under these instructions, "'a jury finding that the defendant has acted knowingly
and willfully is inconsistent with a finding that the defendant acted in good faith.'"
Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, at ^f 20 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Ervasti,
201 F.3d 1029, 1041 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding "good faith" instruction was not necessary
because "jury could not have found [defendant] guilty unless it believed she willfully
violated the tax laws and, thus, did not act in a good-faith misapprehension of the law").
Thus, no additional instruction on good faith was required, and defendant's claim
fails. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, f 23; Cheeks, 498 U.S. at 201; Pomponio, 97 S. Ct. at
24; Dorotich, 900 F.2d at 193; Stone, 431 F.2d at 1289 & n.9.
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m i s COURT SHUUJLD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED HIS MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL WHERE DEFENDANT RELIES ON GROUNDS NOT
PRESERVED BELOW.
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied Ins motn m for \w \ dial,
because "the State utilized perjured trsl in iunv \h\ Mien Davis] to establish the
fou n 1.1; 11111 n I (>r 1 i ie ledger allegedly created by the defendant," "Davis's presence
throughout this case [was] substantially marked by subtle manipulation of fact and
witnesses and general skullduggery," and there was "apparent collusion between I )avis
and the prosecutor" which was "conipvMinded" In the prosecutor's subsequently replacing
defendant as Neways' corporate counsel. Aplt. Br. at 24, 25,27. However, defendant's
claim is not adequately briefed. Moreover, because none of the grounds defendant now
raises were preserved below, this Court should refuse to considei I he in
A.

Proceedings below.

At trial, Allen Davis testified that he received a copy of defendant's ledger from
his secretary, Angie Howell, perhaps in February 1997 (Tr. 50, 52). Davis later testified
that he made a photocopy of the ledger on the day defendant was terminated in either late
June or early July I *>y 7 ( 11 S v56).
Although defendant stated in his motion for new trial that, "prior to [Davis's]
testimony,... [the prosecutor] represented to the defendant that Allen Davis received
[the] ledger... from the defendant's wife after she had been InMten hv delend.ini' IR.
190), defendant i lever cross-examined Davis oi i that issue nor objected to Davis's
19

testimony on the ground that it was potentially inconsistent with the prosecutor's pre-trial
statements. Rather, when the State attempted to have a copy of the ledger admitted as
State's Exhibit 1, defendant objected only because Davis "indicated originally that he
received this document in February of 1997 and he then changed his story and said, no,
I—I photocopied it when he—when Mr. Thompson left in July of 1997" (Tr. 57).
In his motion for new trial, defendant made only one claim in connection with
Davis's testimony. Specifically, defendant claimed that Davis "committed perjury...
when he testified that he had found [defendant's] ledger in the Defendant's desk" because
the prosecutor had previously told defendant that "Davis received [the] ledger . . . from
the defendant's wife after she had been beaten by defendant" (R. 186, 187, 190, 194).
The trial court denied defendant's motion without opinion or a hearing (R. 21316).
B.

This Court should reject defendant's claims because they are not
properly briefed.

Under rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, defendant's brief
must contain an argument "with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
"Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966
(Utah 1989); State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997). This Court "is
20

entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply
a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research." State v. Helmick, 2000 T T'
quotation marks omitted); sec n

v,;

»

•

-

t V { ^ i r . J 15, 25 (Utah App. 1996).

I fiali COIIM.S lt;n < • consistently refused to consider issues that have not been adequately
briefed. See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304-05; State v. Yates, 834 l\2d 599,, 602 {I Mali App.
1992); see alsoMacKayv. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-4"! I Mali I »W), !J<//*<r w U S
Gen.,Inc., 916 I" M 1>(H. W(»S (I 'tali lw<>). /f/////v r Summerhays, 927P.2d 197, 198
(Utaf i App. 1996).
Here, defendant provides no legal analysis or record support for Ins claims.
Although defendant cites to Walker v. State, 624 K M <>K 7 (I Jtah 19X1 KtiuUniy (I*M1 mew
trial was required where Stall w as awaiv of itunviicitt*" ,md misleading testimony harmful
to flefciise but tinted to disclose it), he fails to explain how Davis's testimony in this case
constituted perjury under Walker or, even if Davis's explanation of how he came to
possess the ledger was false, how this false testimony was groin id foi a, new trial See
Thomas, 961 I' 111 i i f W M '' 11 n p I! u I h i i lie 24(a ^

« • quires not just bald citation to

aulliontv hut development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority."); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991) (holding that, to warrant new
trial, evidence of perjury must be such that it coi
not be "merely cumulative," a?

(

must

10 render a different result probable on
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the retrial of the case"); State v. Mildenhall, 141 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah 1987) (holding that,
to warrant new trial based on false testimony, defendant must show that the statements
were made "with the belief that they were not true" and that there is "a reasonable
likelihood that the testimony could have substantially affected the verdict").
Similarly, defendant provides no legal support for his claims that Davis's alleged
"skullduggery" or his alleged friendly relationship with the prosecutor constitute bases for
a new trial. See Helmick, 2000 UT 70, at ^f 7 (holding appellate court "is not a depository
in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research"); Vigil,
922P.2dat25.
Finally, defendant's argument does not contain a single citation to the record. See
Aplt. Br. at 24-28. Moreover, most of defendant's allegations are completely without
record support. See, e.g. Aplt. Br. at 26 (allegation that Allen burglarized materials from
defendant's home); id. (allegation that Allen "worked behind the scenes to ensure that
no one at Neways communicated with [defendant]"); Aplt. Br. at 27 (allegation that
prosecutor knew Neways and Davis were being investigated for federal tax crimes and
that defendant was witness therein); id. (allegation that prosecutor accepted defendant's
former position as Neways' corporate counsel). See further discussion below at
Subpoint C.
Because defendant's claims are inadequately briefed, this Court should refuse to
consider them.
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(J.

Defendant cannot challenge the trial court's denial of his motion
for new trial on grounds not raised below for which there is no
record support.

"1 Ms [Cjouri is not tin- [inipn Imum lo mtei tain what is, in effect, amotion for a
newwial" State v Kinder, 14 Utah 2d 199, 381 P.2d 82, 84 (1963). Thus, an issue not
raised in a motion for new trial before the trial court "cannot be considered here foi the;
first time." State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 7M, 7M (Utah I0M), sec also Sian \ Hates, f>;\?
P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982); State w Smith, 11U P 2d 929, 930 n.l (Utah App. 1989).
This is particularly so where defendant's failure to raise a claim below renders the
record insufficient to review the claim on appeal. See State v. Litherland, J000 1 1 76, *f
17, 12 P.3d 92 ("Appellants bear the burden of proof \v ilh respect to flicn appeals,,
including the burdens of attending the preservation and presentation of the record.");
Star

Wulffenstein, o / P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982) ("When a defendant predicates error

to this Court, he has the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation with an
adequate record."). Where defendant raises an issue that "was not i aisetl lor
determination by

*

ppeai m the record[,] . . . defendant's

assignment ol error stands as a unilateral allegation which the reviewing] court has no
power to determine." Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d at 292-93.
Here, defendant never claimed before (lie dial louil l(i;i( "Paxils presence
throughou \\u

any marked by subtle manipulation of fact and

witnesses and general skullduggery" or that there was an "apparent collusion between
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Davis and the prosecutor." Aplt. Br. at 25, 27. Thus, these issues are raised for the first
time on appeal, and this Court should refuse to consider them. Fierst, 692 P.2d at 753;
Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292; Kinder, 381 P.2d at 84; Smith, 776 P.2d at 930 n.l.
Moreover, because defendant failed to raise these claims below, nothing currently
exists in the record to support them. For this reason also, defendant's claims fail. See
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d at 292-93.
D.

Although defendant raised his perjury claim in his motion for
new trial, he waived that claim by not objecting to Davis's
testimony at trial.

"A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim
on appeal." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Holgate,
2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993).
Thus, "[rjaising an issue [for the first time] in a post-trial motion . . . does not preserve
that issue for appeal" unless the trial court either takes evidence or holds an evidentiary
hearing on the issue. Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah App.
1994). Cf. State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d
1150,1161 (Utah 1991); State v. Matsamas,S0S P.2d 1048,1052 (Utah 1991); State v.
Mildenhall, 1M P.2d 422, 425 (Utah 1987).
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! r defendant claimed in his motion for new trial that he knew prior to Davis's
testimony that Davis had "received [the] ledger allegedly created by the defendant
from the defendant's wife after she had been beatei

wever,

defendant never objected to I );ivis's testimony on the ground that it differed from the
prosecutor's pre trial representation. Thus, defendant did not properly preserve this claim
for appeal. See Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551. Moreover, the trial court did not revive this
claim in defendant's motion for new trial because (lie cuiil denied the motion \N ilhout
opinion or a hearing. See Estate v. Covington, 888 P.2d at 678.
Consequently, defendant's perjury claim is not properly preserved, and this Court
should refuse to consider it.
In any case, even were defendant's perjury claim piopei ly pi e^Tveil, it laiK
because defendant has not demonstMlnl thai even assuming Davis testified
inconsistently, any falsity justifies a new trial. For false testimony to warrant a new trial,
defendant must demonstrate that the evidence could not have been discovered prior to or
at trial, that the evidence is not "merely cumulative," .mil that the evidence is "'such ,o. to
render a different

lal of the case." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781,

793 (Utah 1991); see also State v. Mildenhall, 141 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah 1987) (holding
that, to warrant new trial based on false testimony, defendant must show (hat I he
statements were made "with the belief that they \\e»e nuf true" ami dial there is "a
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reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have substantially affected the verdict").
Defendant cannot make that showing here.
First, defendant stated in his memorandum in support of his motion for new trial
that he was aware of Davis's alleged false testimony at the time Davis gave it (R. 190).
Thus, defendant cannot show that the evidence could not have been discovered prior to or
at trial. See James, 819 P.2d at 793.
Second, even without the story about defendant's wife, Davis's testimony
concerning the source of defendant's ledger was sufficiently inconsistent at trial to allow
defendant to attack Davis's credibility in closing argument (Tr. 514 (arguing that Davis's
testimony about source of ledger "was nothing more than an undisguised, bald-faced
lie"); 527-28 (arguing Davis "lied to you"). Thus, any evidence concerning a possible
third source of the ledger is "merely cumulative." James, 819 P.2d at 793.
Finally, the evidence establishing defendant's guilt was strong. Thus, testimony
that Davis obtained a copy of defendant's ledger from defendant's wife after defendant
had abused her is not the type of evidence that would "render a different result probable
on the retrial of the case." Id.
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
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THE FAILURE TO RECORD ONE WITNESS'S TESTIMONY
OVER THE COURSE OF A FOUR-DAY TRIAL DOES NOT
WARRANT A NEW TRIAL WHERE THE RECORD HAS BEEN
PROPERLY SUPPLEMENTED WITH AN AFFIDAVIT FROM
THAT WITNESS.
Defendant claims that a new trial is required because the testimony of State
witness Karin Lane was not recorded due to a malfunction in the trial court's videotape
equipment. He claims this missing testimony "unconstitutionally prejudice) s | | his | right
to appeal" because he is challenging the si iffieieiiey n( (he e\ ideneo to support his
convictions and lUfhe parties luive been unable to recreate either a record of her testimony
or of the objections thereto." Aplt. Br. at 27, 28. Defendant's claim fails, however,
where this Court granted the State's unopposed motion to supplemeiil the iccoi J w ifli Ms.
Lane's affidavit detailing her testimony, and, (he supplemented testimony does not
undermine (he sufficiency of the evidence supporting defendant's convictions.
A.

Relevant proceedings.

Defendant's trial lasted four days (R. 192-94). In all, the State called mm
witnesses (Tr. 43, 112, 12<>, 1.52, I /<>, I ()5, 258, 3M, 40,.! >
! I\,n m I ;me, a Neways
employee ii I tl le accoi mtii ig department, appeared as the second witness on the first day
(R. 266). Because of a malfunction in the trial court's recording device, Ms. Lane's
testimony was not recorded. Hers was the only testimony lost.
On or about November 5, 1999, defendant filed » Motion to Amend Record
Pursui.

i{ii) oi me Rules of Appellate Procedure with the trial court. (R. 241).
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In his supporting memorandum, defendant indicated the need to supplement the record
with Ms. Lane's testimony and suggested that the record could be reconstructed based, in
part, on notes his counsel had taken during Ms. Lane's testimony (R. 245).
On or about December 10,1999, the trial court ruled on defendant's motion and
ordered that "[c]ounsel should work together to prepare an acceptable statement of Ms.
Lane's testimony to include in the record" (R. 259).
On September 13, 2000, the State filed a letter with this Court indicating that it
was enclosing an affidavit signed by Ms. Lane detailing her testimony at trial and that it
was forwarding a copy of the affidavit to defendant's counsel for a response. Letter dated
Sept. 13, 2000 (Addendum C).
On November 13, 2000, having received no response from defendant's counsel,
the State filed a Motion to Supplement the Record and Memorandum. State's Mot. to
Supp. (Addendum C).
On December 4, 2000, this Court granted the State's motion, noting that
"[a]ppellant did not object or otherwise respond to the motion" (R. 265).
B.

Defendant's claim of an inadequate record fails where the record
has in fact been properly supplemented.

Due process and a criminal's constitutional right to appeal "crequire[] that there be
a record adequate to review specific claims of error.'" West Valley City v. Roberts, 1999
UT App 358, Tf 11,993 P.2d 252 (quoting State v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah App.
1996).
28

I low evet iincc a record has been reconstructed, the defendant must show "that the
reconstruction procedure was defective," Emig v. Hayward, 703 Wld It 14 3, I (Ml' \\ it a11
1985), or "explain why an agreed statement of the recou I is not sufficient befon tin- [he]
is entitled to [relief);' (7/r of Mm ntv v Robinson* K78 P.2d 1151, 1152 (Utah 1994). See
also Ih'fhtrtment ofCmty. Affairs v. Utah Merit Sys. Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Utah
1980) (holding reconstruction of record adequate where affidavit of witness and affidavit
of counsel for State "sufficiently cured the defect.. . in view of flic fin ( lh.it m \ laini is
made that the affidavits arc m error on nn\ material issue").
Here, defendant both moved for reconstruction of Ms. Lane's testimony in the trial
court and indicated that such reconstruction was possible (R. 241, 245). Then, he "did
not object or otherwise respond" to the State's motion to supplement the ivo »iil with Ms.
Lane's affidavit (R. 265). htullv, he now hen; challenges this Court's grant of the
Stale's mi mon »»»supplement, and that supplementation does not undermine defendant's
convictions. Therefore, the record on appeal properly contains the substance of Ms.
Lane's testimony.
Consequently, defent
Ms. Li- • -

npeal has been violated because

u imony was not properly recorded fails.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
convictions.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

59-1-401. Penalties.
(1) (a) The penalty for failure to file a tax return within the time prescribed
by law including extensions is the greater of $20 or 10% of the unpaid tax
due on the return.
(b) Subsection (1) does not apply to amended returns.
(2) The penalty for failure to pay tax due shall be the greater of $20 or 10%
of the unpaid tax for:
(a) failure to pay any tax, as reported on a timely filed return;
(b) failure to pay any tax within 90 days of the due date of the return,
if there was a late filed return subject to the penalty provided under
Subsection (lXa);
(c) failure to pay any tax within 30 days of the date of mailing any notice
of deficiency of tax unless a petition for redetermination or a request for
agency action is filed within 30 days of the date of mailing the notice of
deficiency;
(d) failure to pay any tax within 30 days after the date the commission's
order constituting final agency action resulting from a timelyfiledpetition
for redetermination or request for agency action is issued or is considered
to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b); and
(e) failure to pay any tax within 30 days after the date of afinaljudicial
decision resulting from a timely filed petition for judicial review.
(3) (a) Beginning January 1, 1995, in the case of any underpayment of
estimated tax or quarterly installments required by Sections 59-5-107,
59-5-207, 59-7-504, and 59-9-104, there shall be added a penalty in an
amount determined by applying the interest rate provided under Section
59-1-402 plus four percentage points to the amount of the underpayment
for the period of the underpayment.
(b) (i) For purposes of Subsection (3Xa), the amount of the underpayment shall be the excess of the required installment over the amount,
if any, of the installment paid on or before the due date for the
installment.
(ii) The period of the underpayment shall runfromthe due date for
the installment to whichever of the following dates is the earlier:
(A) the original due date of the tax return, without extensions,
for the taxable year; or
(B) with respect to any portion of the underpayment, the date
on which that portion is paid.
(iii) For purposes of this Subsection (3), a payment of estimated tax
shall be credited against unpaid required installments in the order in
which the installments are required to be paid.
(4) (a) In case of an extension of time to file an individual income tax or
corporatefranchisetax return, if the lesser of 90% of the total tax reported
on the tax return or 100% of the prior year's tax is not paid by the due date
of the return, not including extensions, a 2% per month penalty shall apply
on the unpaid tax during the period of extension.
(b) If a return is not filed within the extension time period as provided
in Section 59-7-505 or 59-10-516, penalties as provided in Subsection (1)
and Subsection (2Kb) shall be added in lieu of the penalty assessed under
this subsection as if no extension of time for filing a return had been
granted.
(5) (a) Additional penalties for underpayments of tax are as follows:
(i) If any underpayment of tax is due to negligence, the penalty is
10% of the underpayment.
(ii) If any underpayment of tax is due to intentional disregard of
law or rule, the penalty is 15% of the underpayment.

(iii) For intent to evade the tax, the penalty is the greater of $500
per period or 50% of the tax due.
(iv) If the underpayment is due to fraud with intent to evade the
tax, the penalty is the greater of $500 per period or 100% of the
underpayment.
(b) If the commission determines that a person is liable for a penalty
imposed under Subsection (ii), (iii), or (iv), the commission shall notify the
taxpayer of the proposed penalty.
(i) The notice of proposed penalty shall:
(A) set forth the basis of the assessment; and
(B) be mailed by registered mail, postage prepaid, to the
person's last-known address.
(ii) Upon receipt of the notice of proposed penalty, the person
against whom the penalty is proposed may:
(A) pay the amount of the proposed penalty at the place and
time stated in the notice; or
(B) proceed in accordance with the review procedures of Subsection (iii).
(iii) Any person against whom a penalty has been proposed in
accordance with this subsection may contest the proposed penalty by
filing a petition for an adjudicative proceeding with the commission.
(iv) If the commission determines that a person is liable for a
penalty under this subsection, the commission shall assess the
penalty and give notice and demand for payment. The notice and
demand for payment shall be mailed by registered mail, postage
prepaid, to the person's last-known address.
(6) The penalty for failure to file an information return or a complete
supporting schedule is $50 for each return or schedule up to a maximum of
$1,000.
(7) If any taxpayer, in furtherance of afrivolousposition, has a prima facie
intent to delay or impede administration of the tax law and files a piuported
return that fails to contain informationfromwhich the correctness of reported
tax liability can be determined or that clearly indicates that the tax liability
shown must be substantially incorrect, the penalty is $500.
(8) For monthly payment of sales and use taxes under Section 59-12-108, in
addition to any other penalties for late payment, a vendor may not retain a
percentage of sales and use taxes collected as otherwise allowable under
Section 59-12-108.
(9) As provided in Section 76-8-1101, the following are criminal penalties:
(a) Any person who is required by this title or any laws the commission
administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or permit from
the commission, or who operates without having registered or secured a
license or permit, or who operates when the registration, license, or permit
is expired or not current, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, except that,
notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than $500 nor more
than $1,000.
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of this
title or any lawful requirement of the commission, fails to make, render,
sign, or verify any return or to supply any information within the time
required under this title, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any
false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or
fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony, except that,
notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than $1,000 nor
more than $5,000.

(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the
payment thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty
of a second degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301,
the fine is not less than $1,500 nor more than $25,000.
(d) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this
section is six years from the date the tax should have been remitted.
(10) Upon making a record of its actions, and upon reasonable cause shown,
the commission may waive, reduce, or compromise any of the penalties or
interest imposed under this part.

76-8-1101. Operating without tax license — Tax evasion —
Statute of limitations.
(1) As provided in Section 59-1-401:
(a) Any person who is required by Title 59 or any laws the State Tax
Commission administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or
permit from the State Tax Commission, or who operates without having
registered or secured a license or permit, or who operates when the
registration, license, or permit is expired or not current, is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is
not less than $500 nor more than $1,000.
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title
59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails to make,
render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information within the
time required under this title, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any
false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or
fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony, except that,
notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than $1,000 nor
more than $5,000.
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the
payment thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty
of a second degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301,
the fine is not less than $1,500 nor more than $25,000.
(2) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is
six years from the date the tax should have been remitted.

76-2-103. Definitions.
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviationfromthe
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviationfromthe standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

ADDENDUM B
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

Plaintiff,
vs.

CRIMINAL NO. 981905483

JANES L. THOMPSON,
Defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO. 1
You are instructed that the defendant

JAMES L. THOMPSON

is

charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the
commission of

MAKING A FALSE TAX RETURN and WILLFUL EVASION OF

INCOME TAX . The Information alleges:
COUNT I
MAKING A FALSE TAX RETURN, a Third Degree Felony, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or before 15 April 1997 in violation of
Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 1101 and Title 59, Chapter 1, Section
401, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that JAMES L.
THOMPSON, with intent to evade a tax or requirement of Title 59 or
lawful requirement of the commission, made, rendered, signed or
verified a false or fraudulent return or statement or supplied
false or fraudulent information on his 1996 Utah State Individual
Income Tax Return*
COUNT II
WILLFUL EVASION OF INCOME TAX, a Second Degree Felony, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on or before 15 April 1997 in violation
of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 1101 and Title 59, Chapter 1,
Section 401, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that JAMES
L. THOMPSON, willfully attempted to evade or defeat a tax or the
payment thereof due on his income earned in 1996.

INSTRUCTION NO.

/

It is my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the law applicable to this case, and it is
your duty as jurors to follow the law as I shall state it to you.
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that are presented by the allegations in
the Information filed in this court and the defendant's plea of "not guilty." You should perform
this duty uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passion or prejudice against the defendant
because of the fact that he has been arrested for this offense, or because charges have been filed
against him, or because he has been brought before the court to stand trial. None of these facts is
evidence of his guilt, and you are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them
that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent.
You are to be governed solely by the evidence legally introduced in this trial and the law
as stated to you by me. The law forbids you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture,
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Both the prosecution and the
defendant have a right to demand and they do demand and expect that you will conscientiously
and dispassionately consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that you will
reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be. The verdict
must express the individual opinion of each juror.

INSTRUCTION NO. A
You are the exclusive judges of the facts and of the weight and effect of the evidence, but
you must determine the facts from the evidence received here in Court.
As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not speculate as to
what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the objection.
You must not consider for any purpose any offer of evidence that was rejected, or any
evidence that was stricken out by the Court; such matter is to be treated as though you had never
heard it and must be entirely disregarded.

INSTRUCTION NO. _/__
The evidence to be considered by you includes the testimony of witnesses, exhibits
received by the Court, stipulations of the parties, reasonable inferences to be drawn from facts
proven in the case, presumptions, if any, as are stated in these instructions, and all of the facts
and circumstances disclosed thereby. Statements of either counsel are not evidence and should
not be considered as such by you.

INSTRUCTION NO. 7
If, during this trial, I have said or done anything which has suggested to you that I am
inclined to favor the claims or position of either party, you will not permit yourselves to be
influenced by any such suggestion.
I have not intended to indicate any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of
belief, nor which party should prevail. If any expression has seemed to indicate an opinion
relating to any of these matters, you should disregard it, because you are the exclusive judge of
the facts.

INSTRUCTION NO.

n

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a
defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In case of a
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal.
I have told you that the burden is upon the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute
certainty. "Reasonable doubt" means a doubt that is based on reason and one which is
reasonable in view of all the evidence. It must be reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates all reasonable doubt. A
reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise
from the evidence or the lack of evidence in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO. G
The State of Utah has filed an Information charging the defendant as follows:
COUNT 1
The defendant, James L. Thompson, on or before April 15, 1997, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, committed the crime of Filing a False Tax Return, a violation of Title 76, Chapter
8, Section 1101 and Title 59, Chapter 1, Section 401, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a
Third Degree Felony, as follows: that at the time and place stated above, the defendant, with
intent to evade a tax, a requirement of the Utah Tax Code or lawful requirement of the Utah State
Tax Commission, made, rendered, signed or verified a false or fraudulent return or statement
or supplied false or fraudulent information on his 1996 Utah State Individual Income Tax
Return.

COUNT 2
The defendant, James L. Thompson, on or before April 15, 1997, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, committed the crime of Willful Evasion of Income Tax, a violation of Title 76,
Chapter 8, Section 1101 and Title 59, Chapter 1, Section 401, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, a Second Degree Felony, as follows: that at the time and place aforesaid, the
defendant, willfully attempted to evade or defeat a tax or the payment of taxes due on his income
earned in 1996, as was required by law to be paid.

INSTRUCTION NO.

1

You are instructed that the defendant has entered pleas of not guilty to the charges against
him. The pleas of not guilty deny each and all of the essential allegations of the charges
contained in the Information and casts upon the State the burden of proving each and all of the
essential allegations to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt.

INSTRUCTION NO. 0
Proof of Precise Amount of Tax Owed Not Necessary
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, James L. Thompson,
willfully attempted to evade or defeat a portion of the tax owed.
Although the State must prove a willful attempt to evade a portion of tax, the State is not
required to prove the precise amount of additional tax that may have been evaded or the precise
amount of additional tax owed.

INSTRUCTION NO.

'

Consider Each Count Separately
A separate crime is charged in each count. You must decide each count separately. Your
verdict on one count should not control your verdict on any other count. Failure to File a tax
return is a separate charge from willful evasion of taxes. Each charge should be considered
separately, even if they are for the same year.

INSTRUCTION NO./{Q
Caution - Punishment
Single Defendant — Multiple Counts
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the information. Each charge and
the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The fact that you may find the
defendant guilty or not guilty as to one of the charged offenses should not affect your verdict as
to any other charged offense.
I caution you, members of the jury, that you are here to determinefromthe evidence in
this case whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. The defendant is on trial only for those
specific offenses alleged in the information.
Also, the question of punishment should never be considered by the jury in any way in
deciding the case. If the defendant is convicted the matter of punishment is for the judge to
determine.

INSTRUCTION NO.

ff

Filing a False Return - Nature of the Offense Charged
Count One of the information charges that the defendant, James L. Thompson, was
required by law to file a true and accurate Utah State Individual Income Tax Return for the tax
year 199$, on or before April 15, 1997, and that the defendant, with intent to evade a tax, a
requirement of the Utah Tax Code or a lawful requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission,
made, rendered, signed or verified a false or fraudulent return or statement or supplied false or
fraudulent information on his return.

INSTRUCTION N O / " ^

Filing a False or Fraudulent Return — Statute
Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 1101(b) and Title 59, Chapter 1, Section 401(9)(b) of the
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides, in part that:
Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title 59 or any
lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails to make, render, sign, or
verify any return or to supply any information within the time required under this
title, or who makes renders, signs, or verifies any false or fraudulent return or
statement, or who supplies any false or fraudulent information is guilty of a third
degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less
than $1,000 nor more than $5,000.

INSTRUCTION NO./*?
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of Filing a False or Fraudulent Tax
Return if that person, with the intent to evade;
i) any tax; or
ii) requirement of the Utah State Tax Code; or
iii) lawful requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission;
was required by law to make, render, sign or verify a Utah State Individual Income Tax Return,
but made, rendered, signed or verified a false or fraudulent return or statement or supplied
false or fraudulent information on his return for any given taxable year.

INSTRUCTION NO.

•'

Filing a False or Fraudulent Return
The Essential Elements of the Offense Charged

Before you can convict the defendant James L. Thompson of the crime of filing a
false or fraudulent tax return, a Third Degree Felony, as charged in Count 1 of the Information,
you must find from all of the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the
following elements of that offense:
1. That hefiledan Individual Utah Income Tax Return with the Utah State Tax
Commission concerning his income for the taxable year ending December 31, 1996;
2. That hefileda tax return knowing it contained false information; and;
3. That he acted with intent to evade a tax, a requirement of the Utah Tax Code or lawful
requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission and not as a result of accident or negligence.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt of all of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant guilty. If,
on the other hand, you are not convinced of the truth of each and every one of the foregoing
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you mustfindthe defendant not guilty of the offense
of Filing a False or Fraudulent tax return as charged in Count 1 of the Information.

INSTRUCTION NO. j %
Proof Of One False Item Enough

The indictment charges in Count One that the defendant's income tax return for the year
1996 was false or fraudulent.
You are instructed that it is sufficient if you find that the government has established
beyond a reasonable doubt that any one item was knowingly falsely orfraudulentlyreported on
the defendant's return. In other words, the government does not have to prove that all of the
items on which they offer evidence are false or fraudulent: proof of the falsity of a single item is
sufficient. On the other hand, if you find that none of these items was falsely or fraudulently
reported on the defendant's return, then you should acquit the defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO.Ifj

Omission of Matter
An income tax return may be false not only because of a knowing misstatement of a
matter on the return, but also because of a knowing omission of a matter on the return.

INSTRUCTION NO.

/"7

When Offense Completed

If you find beyond a reasonable doubtfromthe evidence in the case that the defendant
filed a 1 Ise or Fraudulent Utah State Individual Income Tax Return and that this was done with
intent to evade a tax, a requirement of the Utah Tax Code or lawful requirement of the Utah State
Tax Commission as charged in Count One of the Information, then you may find that the offense
charged was complete on the date after each return wasfiledor anytime thereafter.

INSTRUCTION NO. / g ^

Intent
The third and final element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order
to establish the offense of Filing a False or Fraudulent Utah State Income Tax Return is that the
defendant's alleged filing of a false or fraudulent return was "with intent to evade a tax,
requirement of the Utah Tax laws or lawful requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission."
This "intent" means a voluntary, intentional attempt, act or omission, to evade a tax,
requirement of the Utah Tax Code or lawful requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission.
Such intent in the context of a filing a false or fraudulent income tax return, simply means a
voluntary, intentional act, omission, or effort by the defendant to not pay a tax he would
otherwise be required to pay or failure to perform an obligation he would otherwise be required
to perform under the Utah Tax Code or lawful requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission.

INSTRUCTION NO.

M

Intent - Acts
To find the defendant guilty of violating Section 76-8-1101 and Section 59-1-401, you
must not only find that he did the acts or failed to do the acts of which he stands charged, but you
must also find that these actions were done by him with intent to evade a tax, requirement of the
Utah Tax laws or lawful requirement of the Utah State Tax Commission.
The word "intent," as used in this statute, means a voluntary, conscious desire to engage
in conduct that is a violation of a known legal duty. In other words, the defendant must have
acted or failed to have acted when the law required him to act voluntarily and intentionally and
with the specific intent to do something he knew the law prohibited, or with specific intent to fail
to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say, with intent either to disobey or to
disregard the law.
In determining the issue of intent, you are entitled to consider anything done or omitted to
be done by the defendant and all facts and circumstances in evidence that may aid in the
determination of his state of mind. It is obviously impossible to ascertain or prove directly the
operations of the defendant's mind; but a careful and intelligent consideration of the facts and
circumstances shown by the evidence in any case may enable one to infer what another's
intentions were in doing or not doing things. With the knowledge of definite acts, we may draw
definite logical conclusions.
We are, in our daily affairs, continuously called upon to decide from the acts of others
what their intentions or purposes are, and experience has taught us that frequently, actions speak
more clearly than spoken or written words. To this extent, you must rely in part on

circumstantial evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
In this regard, there are certain matters that you may consider as pointing to intent, if you
find such matters to exist in this case. By way of illustration only, intent to evade may be
inferred from conduct such as handling ones affairs to avoid making records usual in transactions
of the kind, such as failing to record sales in order to pay sales tax, and any conduct the likely
effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal.
I give you these instances simply to illustrate the type of conduct you may consider in
determining the issue of willfulness. I do not by this instruction mean to imply that the
defendant did engage in any such conduct. It is for you as the trier of the facts to make this
determination as to whether the defendant did or did not.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^Q

Knowledge of Falsehood
(Deliberate Ignorance)

The fact of knowledge may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence, just as
any other fact in the case.
The element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawnfromproof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant deliberately "closed his eyes" to what would otherwise have
been obvious to him.
A finding beyond a reasonable doubt of a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment
would permit an inference of knowledge. Stated another way, a defendant's knowledge of a fact
may be inferred from proof beyond a reasonable doubt of his deliberate blindness to the existence
of the fact.
It is entirely up to you as to whether you find any deliberate "closing of the eyes," and the
inferences to be drawn from any such evidence. Although knowledge may be inferred from the
defendant's behavior, the issue is what the defendant actually knew or may have "closed his
eyes" to avoid. A showing of an unintentional mistake, carelessness, negligence, even gross
negligence or recklessness is not sufficient to support afindingof intent to evade or knowledge.

INSTRUCTION NO.ff /
A person acts:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to
a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his
conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

INSTRUCTION N O . ^ p
Failure To Pay — Willfulness Defined
The specific intent of willfulness is an essential element of the offense of willful failure to
pay one's income taxes. The term willfully used in connection with this offense means a
voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.
The failure to pay income taxes is willful if the defendant's act or failure to act was
voluntary and purposeful and with the specific intent to fail to do what he knew the law requires
to be done; that is to say, with intent to disobey or disregard the law that requires him to pay
Utah State Income Taxes.
On the other hand, the defendant's conduct is not willful if you find that he failed to pay
his income taxes because of negligence (even gross negligence), inadvertence, accident, mistake,
or reckless disregard for the requirements of the law, or due to his honest misunderstanding of
the requirements of the law.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2 3
Tax Evasion — Nature of Offense Charged

Count Two of the information charges that the defendant, James L. Thompson, who
during the calender year 1996 resided in the State of Utah, willfully attempted to evade or defeat
a part of the income tax due and owing by him or a payment thereof to the State of Utah for the
calendar year 1996, by failing to report all of his taxable income for said calender year or by
taking improper deductions, either of which would affect the amount of taxes owed; and the
defendant knew he failed to report the income or took the improper deductions and that he would
owe more tax than he paid.

INSTRUCTION NO. ?*/
Statute Defining Offense
Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 1101 and Title 59, chapter 1, Section 401, Utah Code
Annotated provides, in part, that:
Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the payment
thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty of a second degree
felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than
$1,500 nor more than $25,000.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Willful Tax Evasion - The Essential Elements
of the Offense Charged

Before you can convict the defendant, James L. Thompson, of the crime of
Willful Evasion of Income Tax, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count 2 of the
Information, you must find from all of the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every
one of the following elements of that offense:
1. That on or before April 15,1997, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant,
James L. Thompson, owed a tax on his 1996 income;
2. That he attempted to evade the tax; and;
3. That he acted willfully.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt of all of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant guilty. If,
on the other hand, you are not convinced of the truth of each and every one of the foregoing
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the offense
of Willful Evasion of Income Tax as charged in Count 2 of the Information.

INSTRUCTION NO. W >
Elements of Attempt - To Evade or Defeat a Tax
To establish the offense of attempting to evade or defeat a tax, the State is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following three elements:
First, an iacome tax was due and owingfromthe defendant in addition to what had been
paid, if anything;
Second, an affirmative attempt, in any manner, to evade or defeat an income tax or
payment thereof, and
Third, the defendant acted willfully.
The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
essential element of the crime charged; the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal
case the burden or duty of calling any witness or producing any evidence.

INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 7
Tax Deficiency
One element of attempted tax evasion is a tax deficiency or, in other words, an amount of
State Income Tax due and owing by the defendant over and above the amount of tax paid by the
defendant. Each year must be considered separately. In other words, the defendant's tax
obligation in any one year must be determined separately from his obligations in any other year.
The defendant is charged with failing to pay an amount of tax due for the calender year
1996 as alleged in the Information. The proof need not show, however, a precise amount or all
of the additional tax due. The State is only required to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant attempted to evade some income tax. An amount is defined as a material amount
or more than just a nominal amount. It is a real amount, not an imaginary amount.

INSTRUCTION NO. j g ^
To "Attempt to Evade or Defeat" a Tax - Explained
The phrase "attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the payment of taxes due"
contemplates and charges that the defendant James L. Thompson knew and understood that
during the calender year 1996, he owed more Utah State Income Tax than had been paid for that
year and then tried in some way to avoid that additional tax.
In order to show an "attempt to evade or defeat any tax", therefore, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant James L. Thompson intended to evade or defeat a tax
due, and that the defendant James L. Thompson also willfully did some affirmative act or
willfully failed to do some act required of him by law in order to accomplish this intent to evade
or defeat a tax.

INSTRUCTION N O . , * ^

To show willfulness the State must also show that the

Defendant had actual knowledge that his conduct was wrongful.

-5-

INSTRUCTION NO. 2 ?
Willfulness
To find the defendant guilty of violating Section 76-8-1101 and Section 59-1-401, you
must not only find that he did the acts of which he stands charged, but you must also find that he
acted willfully.
The word "willfully," as used in this statute, means a voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty. In other words, the defendant must have acted voluntarily and intentionally
and with the specific intent to do something he knew the law prohibited, or with specific intent to
fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say, with intent either to disobey or to
disregard the law.
In determining the issue of willfulness, you are entitled to consider anything done or
omitted to be done by the defendant and all facts and circumstances in evidence that may aid in
the determination of his state of mind. It is obviously impossible to ascertain or prove directly
the operations of the defendant's mind; but a careful and intelligent consideration of the facts and
circumstances shown by the evidence in any case may enable one to infer what another's
intentions were in doing or not doing things. With the knowledge of definite acts, we may draw
definite logical conclusions.
We are, in our daily affairs, continuously called upon to decide from the acts of others
what their intentions or purposes are, and experience has taught us that frequently, actions speak
more clearly than spoken or written words. To this extent, you may rely in part on circumstantial
evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
In this regard, there are certain matters that you may consider as pointing to willfulness, if
you find such matters to exist in this case. By way of illustration only, willfulness may be

inferred from conduct such as handling ones affairs to avoid making records usual in transactions
of the kind, such as failing to record sales in order to pay sales tax, and any conduct the likely
effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal
I give you these instances simply to illustrate the type of conduct you may consider in
determining the issue of willfulness. I do not by this instruction mean to imply that the
defendant did engage in any such conduct. It is for you as the trier of the facts to make this
determination as to whether the defendant did or did not.

INSTRUCTION N O ^ /

To find the Defendant guilty of willful evasion of income

tax by the Defendant with regard to his 1996 tax return in violation of Title 76 Chapter 8
Section 1101 and Title 59 Chapter 1 Section 401 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1955, as
amended, the State must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant's actions
were intentional and willful. That in fact the Defendant underpaid his taxes for the tax year
1996 and that he made an affirmative act constituting an evasion or an attempted evasion of
the tax.

-3-

INSTRUCTION N o 2 2 l
If youfindbeyond a reasonable doubtfromthe evidence in the case that the defendant
evaded a tax and that this was done willfully as charged in Count Two of the Information, then
you mayfindthat the offense charged was complete on the date after the tax was due or anytime
thereafter. A tax is due when the return should have been filed and the person who was required
to make the return is also required to pay the tax at the time the return was due. No notice or
assessment from the Utah State Tax Commission is necessary for the taxpayer to be required to
pay the tax.

INSTRUCTION NO ^ 3

A tax return is not criminally fraudulent simply because

it is erroneous.

-7-

INSTRUCTION NO ^

To find the Defendant guilty of either of the crimes

alleged by the State of Utah, it is not enough to show merely that a lessor tax was paid than
was due, nor is negligent, careless, or unintentional understatement of income sufficient.

-8-

INSTRUCTION NO. j § 3
When you retire to deliberate you should appoint one of your number as foreperson.
Your verdict must be in writing, signed by your foreperson and when found must be returned by
you into court.
Your verdicts in this case must be either GUILTY or NOT GUILTY as to each single
count in the Information. Thus, the verdict must be either:
GUILTY as charged of Count One, or
NOT GUILTY of Count One.
and
GUILTY as charged of Count Two, or
NOT GUILTY of Count Two.

This is a criminal case and it requires a unanimous agreement of all the jurors to find a verdict.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff7Appellee,

STATE'S MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD
and MEMORANDUM

vs.
JAMES L. THOMPSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990437 CA
:

MOTION
PURSUANT TO RULE 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State of Utah
moves this Court to supplement the record on appeal with the affidavit of Karin Lane, the
onginal of which was filed with this Court on 13 September 2000. A copy is attached as
exhibit B.

MEMORANDUM
Supplementation is appropriate here.

Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, provides:
If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what
occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled
by that court and the record made to conform to the truth. If anything
material to either party is omitted from the record by error or
accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial court, or
the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted,
may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if
necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted.
The moving party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall
serve on the parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days
after service, any party may serve objections to the proposed changes.
All other questions as to the form and content of the record shall be
presented to the appellate court.
(Emphasis added.)
Something material to a party was omitted from the record on appeal in this case:
the testimony of State's witness Karin Hale. Apparently, it was not recorded. In a motion
to supplement filed in district court, defendant stated, "Defendant hereby submits that the
record fails to truly disclose what occurred in the trial court inasmuch as Ms. Lane's
testimony has been omitted." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Record
Pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure at 2. The trial court directed

2

counsel to "work together to prepare an acceptable statement of Ms. Lane's testimony to
include in the record." Minute Entry dated 10 December 1999, attached as exhibit A.
After repeated inquiries from this Court concerning the status of the record
supplementation, the State had Ms. Hale prepare an affidavit detailing her testimony that
was omitted from the record on appeal. See exhibit B. On 13 September 2000, the State
filed the original of this affidavit with this Court and pursuant to rule 11(h) served a copy
on defense counsel with a cover letter stating in part: "With defendant's stipulation, this
affidavit should complete the record and permit this case to move forward. By copy of
this letter, with attachment, I invite Mr. Black to stipulate to this procedure or, if he feels
the affidavit is materially inaccurate, to contact me.'* Letter dated 13 September 2000,
attached as exhibit C.
Rule 11(h) specifies, "Within 10 days after service, any party may serve
objections to the proposed changes.'* To date defendant has served no objections to the
proposed affidavit nor communicated with the State concerning it. Accordingly, the State
requests this Court to supplement the record on appeal with the affidavit of Karin Lane.
DATED: [^November2000.

J, JR.
isistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Motion to
Supplement the Record was mailed byfirstclass mail this fcO November 2000 to the
following:
David 0. Black
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE
Williamsburg Office Park
5806 South 900 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
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Exhibit A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

>fiiA
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Exhibit B

State of Utah
County of Utah

)
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I, Karin Lane, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am over 18 yean of age, and have personal knowledge of the facts contained in

this Affidavit
2. .

I am employed in the accounting department for Neways, Inc.

3.

I was called to testify in a trial, State v. Thompson which took place December

14-17,1998.
4.

I was asked to testify concerning my knowledge regarding James Thompson, who

had worked at Neways in their legal department
5.

I wasfirstquestioned by the attorney for the State of Utah.

6.

I was asked questions and responded as follows.

7.

What is my name, Karin Lane. Who is my employer, Neways, Inc. in Salem,

Utah. How long I have I worked there, October 1994 to the present What are my duties at
Neways, I began as an accounting clerk in charge of bank reconciliations and general ledger
duties but I am here as the custodian of records.
8.

I was asked to look at numerous checks and check request formsfromNeways

which I identified and recognized the handwriting as belonging to Annette Jenkins and James
Thompson.
9.

I was asked if these records were made at or near the time of the event they

reflected, if they were made by a person with knowledge, if they were kept in the regular course

G.\ WadrtlarmliotiflWavrt. wpd

of business and if it was our regular practice to keep such records. I responded yes to each of
these questions.
10.

I stated that Annette Jenkins had worked with James Thompson on issuing checks

for Mr. Thompson.
11.

I believe these documents were admitted into evidence.

12.

I was asked to look at several W-2 forms from Neways and A+ Benefits which I

identified.
13.

I was asked if these records were made at or near thetimeof the event they

reflected, if they were made by a person with knowledge, if they were kept in the regular coune
of business and if it was our regular practice to keep such records. I responded yes to each of
these questions.
14.

I believe these documents were admitted into evidence.

15.

I was asked to look at some IRS 1099 formsfromNeways which I identified and

stated that these particular 1099*s had been prepared by Craig Spencer who worked in our
accounting department
16.

I was asked if theserecordswere made at or near the time of the event they

reflected, if they were made by a person with knowledge, if they were kept in the regular course
of business and if it was ourregularpractice to keep such records. I responded yes to each of
these questions.
17.

I believe these documents were admitted into evidence.

18.

I was asked to look at some bi-weekly payroll formsfromNeways to James

Thompson which I identified
G.\Wadt\karmiaMtfRdavit wpd

19.

I was asked if these records were made at or near the time of the event they

reflected, if they were made by a person with knowledge, if they were kept in the regular course
of business and if it was our regular practice to keep such records. I responded yes to each of
these questions.
20.

I believe these documents were admitted into evidence.

21.

I was asked how frequently employees were paid at Neways and responded, every

two weeks.
22.

I was asked how much Mr. Thompson was paid in salary when he started in

October of 1995 and I responded I had calculated that to be S60.000.20 annually and showed the
calculation I had made on a sheet of paper. This document was ^ft*"^ into evidence.
23.

I was asked if that salary was reduced in February of 1996 and I responded that a

calculation of his W-2's for 1996 snowed he had been paid through paychecks $23,148.81 since
February 1996, not the S60.000.20 which was his salary in 1995.
24.

I was asked if the pay amount Mr. Thompson received in paychecks ever changed

again while he was at Neways after mis February drop in pay and I stated I didn't think so.
25.

I was asked if Mr. Thompson received a raise in salary in May of 1996 and March

of 1997 and I responded I wasn't sure.
26.

The attorney for James Thompson then asked me questions.

27.

I was asked if Mr. Thompson's reduction in salary in February of 1996 coincided

with Neways starting with a new payroll services company named A+ Benefits. I stated that
according to the records, Mr. Thompson's salary was reduced thefirstpart of February 1996 and
Neways didn't switch to A+ Benefits, the new payroll service, until the last week of March or the
O:\WafcUonalaMiBdivitwp4

first week of April of 1996.
28.

I was asked if I kept a record of the payments made to third parties on behalf of

Mr. Thompson and I responded I did not. The only record there would be was a folder of the
check request forms that Annette Jenkins was keeping and the computerized general ledger
which shows all the checks issued by Neways. The only ledger of these specific payments I had
even heard about was the one kept by James Thompson in his day planner.
29.

I was asked if I had reviewed the checks to see if they were supposed to be on the

1099 or not and whether they may have been business expenses or not and I answered that this
had been done by Craig Spencer, Dee Mower and Annette Jenkins.
30.

I was asked if I knew if the W-2's and the 1099*$ were accurate and I said I didn't

prepare them but as far as I knew they were accurate and the W-2's were prepared the same way
as all the other W-2's were prepared.
31.

I was asked if I was aware of an embezzlement investigation involving Craig

Spencer and responded that Craig Spencer had reported a suspicious check for cash that he
thought was taken by Annette Jenkins which was investigated by Allen Davis and James
Thompson.
32.

I was asked how I had made copies of me checks that had been presented and I

answered I did not make the actual copies, someone else at Neways had made them.
33.

The attorneyforthe State asked me some more questions to which I responded.

34.

I was asked if Mr. Thompson'sreductionin pay in early February had anything to

do with the change in the payroll service company in late March and I responded that it did not.
35.

I was asked if other employees did workforrelated Neways companies and I said
GAWi*MwtateHffldtvn.wpd

yes.
36.

I was asked if any other employee's pay with third party beneficiaries was

handled similarly to James Thompson's and I stated no.
37.

I was asked if I knew the results of the embezzlement investigation that was

conducted by James Thompson and Allen Davis and I responded I understood Annette Jenkins
was paying back the amount they believe was taken.
38.
i 39.)

The attorney for Mr. Thompson then asked me some questions.
He asked if I thought the 1099*8 and W-2's were accurate and I responded again

that I didn't prepare them but as far as I knew, they were correct
40.

My testimony ended and I was then excused from the trial.

DATED this 23* day of August, 2000.

KarurLane

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 1st dayxif September,
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S T A T E OF U T A H
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL

FILED
Utmh Court of Appeals

SEP 1 3 : : : }
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAMES R SOPEA

REEO RtCHAAOS
Ch*i Otputy Attomty G*uoi

Pautotte Stagg
Citric o*tooCourt

PALMER DEPAULIS
Oirector of Public Policy A Communications

13 September 2000
Hand-delivered
Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
450 South State Street
Post Office Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
Re:

State v. Thompson, Case No. 990437-CA

Dear Ms. Stagg:
I am following up on my letter to you of 31 August 2000.
Enclosed is an original affidavit of trial witness Karin Lane detailing the
testimony that was omittedfromthe record on appeal in the above-referenced case.
With defendant's stipulation, this affidavit should complete the record and permit
this case to move forward. By copy of this letter, with attachment, I invite Mr.
Black to stipulate to this procedure or, if he feels the affidavit is materially
inaccurate, to contact me.

VOROS,JR.
istant Attorney General
copy: David O. Black, attorney for defendant/appellant
Wade Winegar, trial prosecutor

